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ON COLLUSION SUSTAINABILITY WITH STACKED REVERSION 
 
ABSTRACT 
We consider a multi-period oligopoly model to analyze cartel sustainability where a subset of 
collusive firms is exogenously given. We assume that in case of cheating only the cheater is 
expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the cheater. We show that, in our 
model, when firms compete in quantities and the cartel is sufficiently small, a Stackelberg 
leader cartel can always be sustained if firms are patient enough. Furthermore, in this case 
collusion is more easily sustained than when firms play grim trigger strategies. The opposite 
result is obtained in a price-setting supergame with differentiated products. 
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    The analysis of cartel formation in oligopoly markets has a long tradition in the economic 
literature. It is well-known that although there is a general firms' interest in the existence of a 
cartel, the benefits of cartel formation are not evenly distributed and often nonmembers 
obtain higher profits than cartel members.3 
We address the issue of collusion success by considering a supergame-theoretic approach 
(see the seminal paper by Friedman (1971)). In this approach, seemingly independent but 
parallel actions among competing firms in an industry are driven to achieve higher profits and 
this is termed tacit or implicit collusion. The tacit collusion literature is immense and it has 
usually focused on the equilibrium that maximizes industry profits4 (see for example 
Rothschild (1999)) using subgame perfect Nash equilibria -henceforth, SPNE- as solution 
concept although, in practice, it can be observed that many collusive agreements do not 
involve all firms in the industry. In this regard, a significant example is the citric acid 
industry where three North-American and five European firms were fined for fixing prices 
and allocating sales in the worldwide market. Their joint market share was around 60 percent 
(see Levenstein and Suslow (2006)). It is also well known that this repeated game setting 
exhibits multiple SPNE collusive agreements. Therefore, to select among those equilibria the 
literature has usually adopted the particular criterion of restricting strategies to grim trigger 
strategies (see for instance Escrihuela-Villar (2008)) in which defection ruins the relationship 
forever. These strategies do not consider the possibility that after a defection loyal cartel 
members might want to continue colluding. In other words, it seems plausible that a large 
number of firms may not simply fail to coordinate on a punishment strategy for one firm that 
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3 The intrinsic difficulty in convincing firms to constitute a cartel was pointed out by Stigler (1950, p. 25) in a discussion of mergers: “The 
major difficulty in forming a merger is that it is more profitable to be outside a merger than to be a participant”. 
4 Among the few exceptions are Escrihuela-Villar (2008) that analyzes the price effects of horizontal mergers, Escrihuela-Villar (2009) that 
considers how the sequence of play between the cartel and the fringe affects cartel stability or Bos and Harrington (2010) that endogenize 
the composition of a cartel with heterogeneous production capacities. 
deviates from the collusive equilibrium. In this sense, there exists empirical evidence that 
participants in a cartel are not always willing to risk the collapse of collusion by punishing 
deviators. As an example, the Sugar Institute case explained in Genesove and Mullin (2001) 
where occasional incidents of cheating were typically not retaliated against or cheating did 
occur but sparked only limited retaliation. 
    The main purpose of this paper is to analyze cartel sustainability considering a set of 
strategies that could eventually be less grim than the trigger strategies. To that extent, we 
consider that cheating on the cartel agreement results only in the ejection of the defector. Our 
work is most closely related to Eaton and Eswaran (1998) from where the present paper gets 
part of the inspiration. To the best of our knowledge, they are the first to propose a set of 
strategies where non cheating cartel members continue operating as a cartel. They termed this 
scenario stacked reversion. The present paper differs, however, in some important ways. To 
begin with, Eaton and Eswaran consider simultaneous decision between the cartel and the 
fringe. However, in Abreu (1986, 1988) a two-phase output path (with a stick-and-carrot 
pattern) it is proved to be optimal when firms simultaneously choose their output and, 
consequently, the optimal set of strategies has already been characterized in a simultaneous 
decision context.5 Therefore, and since one of the most widely accepted structures to 
characterize collusive behavior is that of a leader cartel, we assume the existence of cartel 
leadership.6 Second, Eaton and Eswaran provide numerical examples of cartel sustainability 
with stacked reversion whereas in the present paper, by assuming an inverse demand curve, 
fairly general results are obtained. 
    We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous firms, an exogenous subset 
of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels 
non-cooperatively.7 We use SPNE as solution concept assuming that in the event a cartel 
member cheats there is stacked reversion. Two different scenarios are considered: (i) firms 
set quantities and therefore, the cartel behaves as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the 
fringe in each period and (ii) there is cartel leadership with differentiated products and price 
competition. We obtain that with quantity competition, when the cartel is sufficiently small, a 
cartel can always be sustained with stacked reversion when firms are patient enough. In this 
case, stacked reversion also proves to be an easier way to sustain collusion than Nash 
reversion. Intuitively, the incentives that fringe firms have to free-ride on the cartel's 
collusive efforts disappear since a firm inside the cartel does not find it desirable to exit 
because each firm in the cartel earns higher profits than each fringe firm. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that the literature that deals with tacit collusion and cartel 
leadership should consider that Nash reversion might not constitute the right way to punish 
the cheater. On the contrary, these results do not carry over to a model with price competition 
and differentiated products. With price competition, each firm in the fringe always earns 
higher profits than each cartel firm. Thus, the free-rider problem that characterizes a cartel-
fringe model arises and the cartel cannot generally be sustained with stacked reversion and 
price competition. In this case, therefore, collusion is always more easily sustained with Nash 
reversion than with stacked reversion. 
    The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model and 
study cartel sustainability with quantity competition in a multi-period oligopoly model with 
stacked reversion and trigger strategies. In section 3 we also consider differentiated products 




                                                
5 Abreu's notion of optimality implies that the range of time discount factors over which collusion is sustainable is maximized. 
6 There exist several real examples of cartel leadership like the Carbonless paper industry (see for instance Harrington (2006)). 
7 The assumption of a cartel involving a subset of firms is based on the fact that some of the best known examples of cartels involve only a 
part of the industry. Some significant cases are the citric acid, the carbonless paper or the North Atlantic shipping industries (see Levenstein 
and Suslow (2006)). 
 
2 THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
    We consider an industry with N>2 firms. Each firm produces a quantity of a homogeneous 
product and for simplicity it is assumed that the total production cost of the firms is equal to 
zero. The industry inverse demand is given by the piecewise linear function: p(Q)=max(0,a-
Q), where Q is the industry output, p is the output price, and a>0. We assume that  
firms, indexed by k=1,...,K -henceforth, cartel firms- behave cooperatively so as to maximize 
their joint profits. The remaining (N-K) firms constitute the fringe and choose their output in 
a non-cooperative way. We assume that only one cartel is formed, and we take K as 
exogenously fixed.8 The assumption of an exogenously given subset of firms colluding is 
based on the fact that cartels often involve an agreement between firms which can easily 
coordinate with each other (e.g. because they are based in the same country or have a 
common corporate culture). The fringe consists of foreign firms or new entrants that could 
not coordinate their behavior with the cartel firms even if they wish so.9 
   We assume that firms compete repeatedly over an infinite horizon with complete 
information (i.e. each of the firms either fringe or cartel observes the whole history of 
actions) and discount the future using a discount factor . Following the cartel and 
fringe literature, we assume that in each period the cartel behaves as a Stackelberg leader 
with respect to the fringe or equivalently, that the strategic advantage of the leadership is only 
available to cartel firms.10 Time is discrete and dates are denoted by t=1,2,.... In this 
framework, a pure strategy for firm k is an infinite sequence of functions with 
 where  is the set of all possible histories of actions (output choices) of 
all cartel firms up to t-1, with typical element , j=1,...,K, =1,...,t-1, and Q is the set of 
output choices available to each cartel firm. We restrict our attention to the case where each 
cartel firm is only allowed to follow the stacked reversion strategies in which in case of 
cheating, only the cheater is expelled from the cartel and collusion continues without the 
cheater.11 Let qK and qF denote the output corresponding respectively to collusion when K 
firms maximize joint profits and non-cooperative behavior. At t=1,  qK, while at 
t=2,3,… 
 
     (1) 
 
In words, in the event a cartel member cheats instead of dissolving the entire cartel, the loyal 
members find in their own interest to continue to produce as a cartel but with one firm less. 
Regarding fringe firms, their optimal response consists of maximizing their current period's 
payoff in such a way that if each firm in a cartel with K members produces qK, then the 
output produced by each fringe firm (qF) is 
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case, cartels containing just over half the firms in the industry are stable (see for instance Donsimoni (1986) or Shaffer (1995)). 
9 As an example, three North-American and five European firms in the citric acid industry were fined for fixing prices and allocating sales in 
the worldwide market. Their joint market share was around 60 percent. The rest of the producers included a variety of minor companies 
based in Eastern Europe, Russia and China (see Levenstein and Suslow (2006)). 
10 The seminal papers in this literature are Selten (1973) and d' Aspremont et al. (1983). 
11 Simultaneous deviations are ignored since, as was remarked by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), “in testing for Nash or subgame-perfect 
equilibria, we ask only if a player can gain by deviating when his opponents play as originally specified” (p. 281). 
We assume also that if a cartel firm deviates fringe firms optimally respond to the deviation. 
We denote by ΠC(N,K) and ΠF(N,K) the profit function of a cartel firm and that of a fringe 
firm when cartel and fringe firms produce respectively qK and qF. Then, cartel firms 
producing qK in each period can be sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game with the 
strategy profile (1) if and only if for given values of N,K and δ, the following condition is 
satisfied 
 
,           (2) 
 
where ΠD(N,K) denotes the profits attained by an optimal deviation from a collusive output. 
Then, we denote by δK the minimum δ required for the condition (2) to be satisfied. Observe 
that for the incentive compatibility condition (2) to make sense, it must also be the case that it 
is satisfied for K-1. Otherwise, ΠF(N,K-1) would not be the profits that a cheater would 
obtain since the cartel of K-1 would not be itself robust against cheating. Consequently, (2) 
has to be also satisfied for cartels with less than K firms in such a way that the following set 
of necessary and sufficient incentive compatibility conditions must all be satisfied 
 
            (3) 
 
It can be verified that the minimum discount factor needed for the joint profit maximization 
of cartel firms to be a SPNE of the repeated game with cartel firms playing (1) is 
 
   (4) 
 
This is true because δK is the minimum δ required for the condition (2) to be satisfied and 
since this implies that if δ≥ δK no firm has incentive to deviate from a cartel with K 
firms. In other words, the set of conditions (3) are also satisfied. Consequently, the following 
definition applies. 
 
Definition 1 δK is said to be the minimum discount factor required for the cartel of K firms to 
be sustainable as a SPNE. Then, a cartel of K firms is said to be sustainable if δ≥ δK and 
. 
 
 Equivalently, a cartel of K firms is more easily sustained than a cartel of  firms 
whenever . We are now in the position to characterize cartel sustainability with 
stacked reversion. 
 
Proposition 1 For N≥4 if K≤f(N)≡ , there exists such 
that if δ≥ the cartel with K firms is sustainable. For N=3, the cartel K=2 is sustainable if 
δ≥0.18. 
 
    Proposition 1 establishes that whenever the size of the cartel is relatively small and firms 
discount the future sufficiently little collusion can always be sustained using stacked 
reversion strategies. The intuition behind this Proposition is as follows. The major difficulty 
in forming a cartel is that it is often more profitable to be outside the cartel than to be a 
participant. Consequently, cartels tend to be unsustainable because their members have 
incentives to free-ride on the profit-enhancing efforts of the cartel. However, this is not true 
when the cartel is relatively small. In other words, we can find a K small enough such that the 
profits of a fringe firm when a cartel with K-1 is active are lower than the profits that a firm 
would obtain being a participant in a cartel with K firms.12 
   A natural question that arises is whether collusion is easier to sustain with the stacked 
reversion or when players adopt trigger strategies. In the latter case, following Friedman 
(1971) these strategies are such that cartel firms adhere to the collusive agreement until there 
is a defection, in which case they revert forever to the static N-firm Nash equilibrium.13 In 
this case, cartel firms producing qK in each period can be sustained as a SPNE of the repeated 
game if and only if, the following condition is satisfied 
 
,                        (5) 
 
where ΠN(N) denotes the static N-firm Nash equilibrium. It is an standard exercise to verify 
that the minimum discount factor required for the cartel of K firms to be sustainable as a 
SPNE using trigger strategies (the minimum δ required for the condition (5) to be satisfied), 
that we denote by , is 
 
     (6) 
 
An easy comparison reveals the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 If K≤(N+3)/2 the cartel of K firms is more easily sustained with stacked 
reversion strategies than with trigger strategies. The converse is true. 
 
     
When the cartel is small enough, the incentives that fringe firms have to free-ride on the 
cartel's collusive efforts disappear and fringe firms make fewer profits than in the static N-
firm Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the stacked reversion is a harsher punishment than 
reverting to the Nash equilibrium and the repeated game with stacked reversion is more 
effective in enforcing an agreement than with Nash reversion. Interestingly, a different form 
of retaliation may inflict tougher punishments and thereby allow sustaining higher collusive 





3 PRICE COMPETITION 
 
    In this section we test whether our results hinge on the assumption of quantity competition 
and homogeneous products by considering also differentiated products and price competition. 
To that extent, we assume that the industry produces non-spatial horizontally differentiated 
products such that the degree of differentiation between the products of any two firms is the 
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13 We note that, in this case, the punishment would also consist of cartel firms losing the strategic advantage of the leadership. 
 
same. As in section 2, we assume that in each period the cartel sets the price before the 




where pi denotes the price of good i and qj the quantity sold of good j. Alternatively, we can 




where  and . It is assumed 
a,b>0 and 0≤b≤1. The value range for b (the common degree of product substitutability) 
implies that the products are viewed as substitutes rather than complements and that the price 
of each product is more susceptible to changes on its own demand rather than changes on 
other product demand. Hence, b=0 implies that the products are completely independent and 
b=1 indicates that they are perfect substitutes. 
    We analyze cartel sustainability extending the analysis of the previous section to price 
competition and differentiated products when cartel firms follow the stacked reversion 
strategies. It is a standard exercise to obtain the critical value below which a cartel member 
does not have incentives to deviate. Although the expression of this cutoff cannot be easily 
simplified, we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 3 With price competition and stacked reversion strategies, sustainable cartels 
exist in only two cases: i) K≤3 and ii) K=4, N=5. 
 
    This result establishes that in the game defined above cartel sustainability is rather difficult 
with price competition. Thus, the implications on cartel sustainability derived in Proposition 
1 do not carry over when firms compete in prices. This difference follows from the fact that 
reaction functions are upward sloping in price games but downward sloping in quantity 
games. With cartel leadership, the reaction of fringe firms reinforces the initial price increase 
that results from the cartel price and therefore the intuitions provided in the previous section 
are reversed when firms compete in prices. Intuitively, with price competition a cartel cannot 
(generally) be sustained with stacked reversion because the continuity of the cartel is not a 
severe enough punishment since fringe firms free ride on the cartel's collusive efforts to 
increase price. However, for a sufficiently small cartel the conferring of leadership status to 
the cartel allows collusion to be sustained with stacked reversion strategies. In this case, 
losing the leadership after defection inflicts a sufficiently harsh punishment on fringe firms in 
order for the cartel to be sustainable. 
    As in the previous section, we compare cartel sustainability with stacked reversion and 
under Nash reversion strategies. This leads to the following result. 
 
Proposition 4 With price competition a cartel is more easily sustained under trigger 
strategies than with stacked reversion strategies. 
 
    Proposition 4 does not come as a surprise and it is perfectly in line with Proposition 3 and 
its intuition. When firms compete in prices, a Nash reversion inflicts a harsher punishment 
than continuing with the cartel without the defector. The intuition is that fringe firms always 
benefit more from a cartel than do the members and consequently, the cartel operating 




4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
    We have developed a theoretical framework to study cartel sustainability using a more 
sophisticated set of strategies than the usual trigger strategies. Following Eaton and Eswaran 
(1998), we assume that in case of defection only the defector is ejected. We obtain that in a 
quantity-setting industry where the cartel produces before the fringe, when firms are patient 
enough collusion can be sustained with stacked reversion strategies. Furthermore, if the cartel 
is relatively small collusion is more easily sustained with stacked reversion than with trigger 
strategies. Conversely, with differentiated products and price competition, a cartel cannot 
generally be sustained with the stacked reversion strategies. 
    Our results suggest that with quantity competition and cartel leadership, a set of strategies 
that could be less grim than the trigger strategies should also be considered to analyze cartel 
sustainability. An alternative interpretation is that the existence of price wars can be limited 
not only by firms' ability to punish a potential deviation but also because a cartel may find 
optimal not to punish the deviator. In other words, usually retaliation includes temporary 
price wars, leading to profits below normal levels for some period of time and it may also 
include actions that are targeted at reducing the profits of the deviant firm. However, we 
proved that it may turn out to be the case that cartel firms find it optimal to leave the 
deviation unpunished which could be an additional explanation for the absence of price wars 
after retaliation. 
    The framework we have worked with is, admittedly, a particular one. To analyze real-
world cases of cartels, firms' capacities, cost asymmetries or an extension to a wider range of 
demand functions should also be considered. Another natural question is also how the cartel 
could be able to impose its most preferred timing in a cartelistic model or considering 




    Proof of Proposition 1. From (4) it can be easily verified that δK is always positive and 
smaller than 1 whenever K≤ . This inequality has a real root 
whenever N(N-2)-7≥0 which is true for N≥4. If N=3 and K=2, δK =0.18. ▄ 
 
    Proof of Proposition 2. From (4) and (6), it is immediate to verify that δK <   whenever 
K≤(N+3)/2. ▄ 
 
    Proof of Proposition 3. The minimum discount factor required for the cartel of K firms to 
be sustainable as a SPNE using stacked reversion with price competition can be easily 
obtained but cannot be simplified (the expression and further details are available from the 
author upon request). We denote this cutoff by .  
Easy calculations show that .  
Consequently, since , there 
exists for K≤3. 
On the other hand, 
which is only smaller than 1 if N< ≃5.505. Consequently, for 
K=4, only when N=5 there exists . Finally, for the case of K>4 since 
is decreasing with b, it is enough to verify that ≥1. To that extent, it 
is easy to prove that >0. Thus, it suffices to check the value of for 
the minimum possible value of N which is K+1. Then, we have that 
 
 which is 
increasing in K and larger than 1 when K>4.609 which proves that if K>4, the cartel is not 
sustainable. ▄ 
 
    Proof of Proposition 4. Like in the proof of Proposition 3, the minimum discount factor 
required for the cartel of K firms to be sustainable as a SPNE using trigger strategies with 
price competition can be easily obtained but cannot be simplified. We denote this cutoff by 
Then, , where we denote the Nash 
equilibrium profits by ΠN(N,K,b). Since obviously, ΠD(N,K,b)> ΠC(N,K,b) and ΠD(N,K,b)> 
ΠN(N,K,b)  >0. On the other hand, it can be easily checked that 
≤1 because ΠC(N,K,b)> ΠN(N,K,b) which implies that . 
Then, it suffices to check that < when . From 
Proposition 3, we only have two cases where the latter is true. It is immediate to verify that 
< ∀b since = has 3 different real roots, b=-(1/3), 
b=-(1/4) and b=-0.285714. Also from the continuity of  and , we 
have that ,  and , 
 which proves that < . 
 
 
On the other hand, if K≤3, it can be verified that = has no real roots 
in b (0,1)∀N,K=2,3. We have that which implies that 
>  ∀N,K=2,3. Finally, 
 
>  and  
> 
, which proves that  
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Razmatramo multiperiodni model oligopola kako bismo analizirali održivost kartela u kojem 
je podskup koluzivnih tvrtki dan egzogeno. Pretpostavljamo da u slučaju prevare samo 
varalica biva izbačen iz kartela te se koluzija nastavlja bez prevaranta. Na našem modelu 
pokazujemo da kad tvrtke konkuriraju u količinama a kartel je dovoljno malen, Stackelberg 
leader kartel može uvijek biti održan ako su tvrtke dovoljno strpljive. Nadalje, u ovom 
slučaju, koluzija se jednostavnije održava nego kad tvrtke igraju „grim trigger“ strategije. 
Obrnuti se rezultat dobiva u cjenovnom nadigravanju s diferenciranim proizvodima. 
 
Ključne riječi: koluzija, „stacked reversion“, „trigger“ strategije (strategije „brzog 
odgovora“). 
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